US history of Iraq war blames commander and lack of plan
June 30, 2008
WA****NGTON: A new US Army history of the Iraq conflict faults
the invasion's top commander for his sudden decision to overhaul
the Baghdad-based US military command.
The 696-page re****t, issued last night, focuses on the 18 months
after President George W.Bush announced in May 2003 that major
combat operations in Iraq were over.
The study concludes that General Tommy Franks's decision to overhaul
the US command in the Iraqi capital, opposed by the army's vice-chief
of staff, produced a short-staffed headquarters led by a newly promoted
three-star general.
"The move was sudden and caught most of the senior commanders in Iraq
unaware," the military historians said.
The unclassified study, based on 200 interviews conducted by military
historians, says the new military headquarters "was not configured for
the types of responsibilities it received".
Donald P.Wright and Colonel Timothy R.Reese, who wrote the re****t
along with the army's contem****ary operations study team, conclude
that US commanders and the civilian leaders in Wa****ngton were too
focused on military victory and lacked a realistic vision of what
Iraq would look like after Saddam Hussein's forces were defeated.
The historians' re****t says a major problem was the lack of detailed
planning ahead of the invasion for the postwar period, in part reflecting
White House and Pentagon optimism about the future of Iraq.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23942008-2703,00.html
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